This article reviews the contributions of prominent theorists on agency problems and agency costs.
Authors
Vinay Khandelwal, Institute of Business Management, GLA University, Mathura 281406, India; Stirling Management School, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, UK.
Prasoon Tripathi, Institute of Management Studies, Ghaziabad 201015, India.
Varun Chotia, Jaipuria Institute of Management Jaipur, Jaipur 302033, India.
Mohit Srivastava, Department of Strategy and Entrepreneurship, EM Normandie Business School, 76600 Metis Lab, France.
Prashant Sharma, Associate Professor, Jindal School of Banking & Finance (JSBF), O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana, India.
Sushil Kalyani, Department of Management, NIIT University, Neemrana 301705, India.
Summary
An agency problem is defined as a conflict of interest arising due to a misalignment of interests among the managers and other stakeholders of the company. This article aims to review the articles addressing the agency problem and their impact on business performance. This article reviews the contributions of prominent theorists on agency problems and agency costs.
Using bibliometric attributes of 740 articles from the Scopus database, this study highlights the publishing trend and outlets, along with leading contributors and collaborators in terms of authors, institutions, and countries.
This study identifies the clusters through the bibliographic coupling technique and a trend topics analysis. Most researchers have focused on corporate governance and expressed the agency problem as one of the impact areas.
This study is unique as no study to date specifically focuses solely on agency theory or the agency problem through the lens of bibliometric analysis. Future research directions on agency problems and their solutions conclude this study.
Published in: Journal of Risk and Financial Management
To read the full article, please click here.
